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COMMENT
ASLEEP AT THE SCHOOL-BUS WHEEL:
THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN
SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT AND HOW TO SAVE IT
RICHARD MIYASAKI*
I. INTRODUCTION
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
“separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.  Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated . . . are, by reason of the segregation complained of,
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment . . . .
Because . . . of the wide applicability of this decision, and be-
cause of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of de-
crees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity.1
* The author, Richard Miyasaki, Golden Gate University School of Law, JD Candidate May
2015, would like to extend enormous thanks to Professor Mark Yates of Golden Gate University
School of Law for his guidance and support throughout the creation of this Comment.  The author
would also like to thank his fellow staff writers and editors at the Golden Gate University Law
Review.  This Comment also owes much to the hard working and talented teachers of Abraham
Lincoln High School in San Jose, California.  While the author has moved on from his time as a high
school teacher, he will never forget those who have dedicated their lives to the education of future
generations.  Lastly, the author would like to thank his parents, who have been an ever-present
source of encouragement and support of education not only of the author but also of the larger
community.
1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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Since the doctrine of “separate but equal” in public education was
invalidated in 1954, our society, and our schools in particular, have faced
a daunting task.  In a racially charged nation in which many communities
remain de facto segregated, the Supreme Court placed a major burden on
our schools to reflect the multi-ethnic nature of our larger community.2
In the decades since, further decisions by the Supreme Court and the
appellate courts have clarified this duty to address the segregation that
exists de facto in our school systems today.  This shifting challenge has
changed from one of correcting institutionalized segregation to one of
correcting for segregation arising as a result of our ethnically divided
society.  This means that we are still faced with the burdensome question
of how to deal with ethnicity in our schools.
Courts have crafted a variety of orders to correct school segregation
across the nation, but these solutions have not always had the desired
long-term effect.  Many school systems, whether they are large or small,
urban or rural, have had to face these issues.3  San Jose Unified School
District in Santa Clara County, California (“the District”) demonstrates
the complexity of crafting workable solutions to segregation.  The Dis-
trict faced judicial intervention in the 1970’s, but despite the seeming
effectiveness of the court-ordered desegregation, the current data demon-
strates a return to significant ethnic imbalances that were present before
desegregation efforts.
If our society is still of the belief that “separate but equal” is any-
thing but equal, then segregated schools place a burden on our children
and the educators we trust to educate those children.  If we are not going
to abandon the goal of desegregating schools, then we must find ways in
which to address this issue.  We must examine if segregation exists in
our schools, such as those in San Jose, and we must examine how others
have addressed this issue.  In doing so, we must accept that each school
system poses its own unique set of problems, and although solutions may
be complex, we must at a minimum examine what options may be avail-
able to us.
Segregation is certainly something that is on the minds of at least
some teachers.  In August 2005, I became a Drama teacher at Abraham
Lincoln High School in San Jose, California.  After receiving my Mas-
ters in Dramatic Arts, I was excited to have an opportunity to teach at
this school, which was one of the premier Performing Arts programs in
the area, with many of the students active and enthusiastic participants in
2 Emily Badger, Housing Segregation Is Holding Back the Promise of Brown v. Board of
Education, WASH. POST, May 15, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/
05/15/housing-segregation-is-holding-back-the-promise-of-brown-v-board-of-education/.
3 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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the program.  As I later discovered in conversation with my coworkers,
the arts programs at this school, and similar programs elsewhere in the
school district, were implemented as part of a court-ordered plan to elim-
inate segregation in the schools; however, that order had recently been
lifted after a finding that the district had eliminated segregation in those
schools.
These same teachers, some of whom had been teaching at this
school since before 1980, predicted that the removal of the court order
and a return to the previous enrollment practices would lead to the return
of segregation in the district and another probable lawsuit down the road.
When presented with the opportunity to look into this court order and its
ultimate outcomes, I found it readily apparent based upon the data dis-
cussed below that the solution ordered by the court has not had a lasting
effect.  Although the problems posed by desegregation today may seem
insurmountable, it behooves us to examine all possible approaches before
abandoning desegregation efforts entirely.  Perhaps, amongst the many
different approaches, there exists some combination that may yield last-
ing results.  In any event, a different approach than that which is cur-
rently in use will be necessary to avoid a return to court.
To determine if the District will be vulnerable to future litigation in
this area, we begin by looking at the District’s past and the results of its
prior efforts toward desegregation.  We must also look at what the court
deemed to be the desegregated school system that resulted from that
court order.  By comparing the past situations, both before and after the
court-ordered desegregation plan, with the current state of the District’s
schools, we can determine if the District is again in danger of being
found to be a segregated school system.  Having been previously found
to have desegregated its schools, if the District has returned to the situa-
tion that precipitated the initial court order through its own knowing ac-
tions, it will likely be at risk of further legal action.
If the District has resegregated, we must also examine possible solu-
tions that could be implemented at various stages.  Although any deseg-
regation plan will be inherently complex, and possibly beyond the ability
of the District to implement, this Comment will examine some ap-
proaches that may have use in alleviating issues present in the District.
These possible solutions may take a number of forms that have been used
across the nation, including those previously applied in San Jose.  We
must also examine the United States Supreme Court cases in this area,
starting with Brown v. Board of Education.4  However, the application of
any approach in San Jose may be of particular difficulty, as it was
4 Id. 347 U.S. 483.
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pointed out by the court that San Jose presents a unique challenge in that
it covers a wide geographic area that incorporates both urban and subur-
ban areas.5  We must also examine how current California statutory law
may impact any prospective desegregation plans.  This includes the im-
pact of California Proposition 209,6 which prohibits the use of ethnicity
in any public education program.
In summary, this Comment will examine the history of school de-
segregation in San Jose, how the law bears upon those orders and any
possible future plans, whether San Jose will likely again face allegations
of operating segregated schools, and how the school authorities or courts
may find a more lasting solution.  Specifically, it will examine the impact
of desegregation in the District’s high schools and possible solutions.
Although no simple solutions are present, it is my hope that this Com-
ment may both bring attention to this issue and offer areas for further
exploration in attempting to deal with segregated schools today.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN SAN JOSE
1. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District
Segregation in San Jose schools first came to the attention of the
courts in 1971.7  In November of that year, a group of parents sued the
District for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by purposefully maintaining a segregated school system.8
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found that
the District had acted with knowledge of racial imbalances in its schools
relative to the overall racial percentages for the district, and that the Dis-
trict had recognized that such segregation is “inherently harmful.”9  De-
spite this knowledge, the District moved forward with new school
construction that ignored the negative impact these new schools would
have on racial segregation in the District.10  Of twelve schools authorized
for construction in 1971, over half had Spanish-surnamed enrollment in
excess of 50%,11 while the percentage of Spanish-surnamed students in
5 Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 310, 313 (N.D. Cal. 1976), vacated, 612
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
6 CAL CONST. art. I, § 31.
7 Diaz, 412 F. Supp. at 311.
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 315.
10 Id. at 316–17.
11 Id. at 318.
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol45/iss2/5
2015] Asleep at the School-Bus Wheel 153
the district was 24.6%.12  This demonstrates the radical disparities be-
tween what would be expected based upon the ethnic composition of the
district as a whole versus the ethnic composition of these individual
schools.  These new schools were constructed despite both the District’s
awareness of the segregative impact and the existence of available alter-
native school sites that would have avoided such an effect.13
The district court found that these choices by the District did not
have segregative intent because the imbalances in school enrollment re-
sulted from the District’s adherence to a neighborhood school enrollment
policy.14  However, this decision was vacated by a panel of the Ninth
Circuit, which found that, although neighborhood school policies are not
unconstitutional by themselves, the school site decisions of the District
might have been motivated by discriminatory intent, and “[s]trict adher-
ence to a neighborhood policy is no more than circumstantial evidence”
of the non-existence of segregative intent.15
Although the district court on remand again found for the District,16
this was ultimately reversed by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, based
upon the cumulative weight of evidence concerning the District’s activi-
ties involving school site selection, allocation of transportation resources,
faculty and staff assignments, and the departure from policies that would
otherwise have involved the busing of Anglo students.17  The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that “choices that consistently maintained or intensified segre-
gation” supported “the firm conviction that the district court was clearly
erroneous in its ultimate conclusion that the Board did not act with segre-
gative intent.”18
On remand, the district court ordered, among other things, that stu-
dents electing to attend schools based on participation in magnet pro-
grams be given priority in enrollment, with student ethnicity being
12 Id. at 314.
13 Id. at 319.
14 Id. at 335.
15 Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 612 F.2d 411, 415–16 (9th Cir. 1979).
16 Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 518 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev’d, 733 F.2d
660 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
17 Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 674–75 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“The
District . . . deliberately ignored state guidelines in making decisions and consistently refused to
implement suggestions for desegregation. . . . [The District’s Board of Education] sited new schools,
rebuilt the Field Act schools, used portables and closed schools in a manner that maintained and, in
some instances, intensified ethnic imbalance. . . . [It] used buses for one-third of its students, but
refused to use those buses to achieve integration. . . . [It] assigned faculty and staff on the basis of
ethnic origin without any plausible neutral justification. . . . [It]responded to overcrowding in the
schools by instituting educationally disadvantageous double sessions and departed from its neighbor-
hood school policy to avoid transferring Anglo students to predominantly Hispanic schools. . . .
[It]consistently rejected other suggestions for desegregating its schools.”).
18 Id. at 675.
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actively used as a determinative factor to prioritize these enrollments if a
school had not reached the required ethnic percentages.19  These magnet
programs were created to provide specialized and focused instruction.20
Students electing to participate in one of the specialized magnet pro-
grams, such as performing arts, science and engineering, or various voca-
tional programs, would be given priority in enrollment, in contrast to the
procedure followed by neighborhood schools, which enroll students pri-
marily based upon their proximity to the school site.21
The District supported this approach, stating that the use of magnet
schools in particular would “lead to effective and stable desegregation if
given an opportunity to succeed.”22  Although other school systems have
used an assortment of other approaches to choice-based systems, such as
charter schools,23 some scholars have warned that such systems can lead
to an increase in segregation.24  Given the short-term successes that the
Diaz plan achieved, this Comment will limit its discussion of choice-
based plans to those attempted under this plan.
2. The Temporary Success of the Diaz Plan
The court-ordered plan mandated that the District schools be deseg-
regated within five years.25 After the final court proceeding, the target
year was set at the 1990–1991 school year.26  The goal was defined as at
least 20% majority and 20% minority students, with neighborhood
schools within +/- 20% of the district majority percentage.27  In other
words, any single school must have at a minimum 20% Caucasian and
20% Hispanic students, with the actual percentages being within 20% of
the district totals.  According to the data presented in the court’s findings
and available from the California Department of Education, we find the
following enrollment percentages for Hispanic students in the District
high schools for the years 1973 and 1993:28
19 Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 633 F. Supp. 808, 817 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
20 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7231 (Westlaw 2015).
21 See Diaz, 633 F. Supp. at 817.
22 Id. at 827.
23 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605 (Westlaw 2015) (authorizing persons other than school districts
to operate public charter schools).  Since charter schools are not initiated by school districts, but
rather by private individuals or companies, they will not be discussed in this Comment.
24 See Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American
Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814 (2011).
25 Diaz, 633 F. Supp. at 812.
26 Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 861 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1988).
27 Diaz, 633 F. Supp. at 813.
28 See Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 310, 314–22 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
vacated, 612 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979); DataQuest, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (Nov.
4, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/page2.asp?level=school&subject=enrollment&
6
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School Percentage of Hispanic Enrollment 
 1973 1993 Net Change 
All District Schools 24.6 45.7 +21.1 
Abraham Lincoln 50.2 59.0 +8.8 
Gunderson (opened 1976) NA 27.3 NA 
Leland 3.4 12.8 +9.4 
Pioneer 8.1 38.6 +30.5 
San Jose 64.7 62.3 -2.4 
Willow Glen 13.6 50.2 +36.6 
Table 1. Hispanic Student Enrollment Percentages for 1973 and
1993
These numbers show us the situation both when the District was
found to be segregated and after the court order had been implemented.
Given the large increase in Hispanic enrollment in the District as a
whole, we can see that this increase was distributed in a manner that
brought the high schools within the +/- 20% requirement in almost all the
District high schools.  Even the one high school not meeting the mark by
1993, Leland High School, had shown a significant increase from 3.4%
to 12.8% Hispanic enrollment.  The policies of a school district are often
fluid, however, and once released from the court order the District soon
changed enrollment procedures and policies.  The impact of these
changes will be examined below.  First, we will turn to the shape of
desegregation law as it has come down from Brown.
B. BROWN AND APPROACHES TO DESEGREGATION
Any discussion of school desegregation law must begin with a dis-
cussion of Brown v. Board of Education,29 the first case to recognize
school segregation as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  In overturning the policy of “separate but
equal,”30 the Court in Brown held that “[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal.”31  Ending unconstitutional segregation in
schools, the Court said, “may require solution of varied local school
submit1=submit.From this page, information can be accessed by selecting school years and entering
school names. Numbers for 1973 were used by the court and numbers for 1993 are used as a near
approximation for the target year of 1991 while giving some additional time for numbers to stabilize
in the student population.  1993 data was found by using DataQuest and looking at School
Demographics: Enrollment and looking by school. See id.
29 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 349 U.S. 483.
31 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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problems.”32  In response to the Court’s direction that local education
authorities and courts craft plans to eliminate segregation,33 a multitude
of approaches were developed across the country, and a line of cases was
heard by the Court addressing the question of appropriate plans.  Begin-
ning with Green v. County School Board34 and up through Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,35 the
Court has delineated a set of requirements for any constitutionally valid
desegregation plan.
In Green, the Court addressed the validity of a freedom-of-choice
plan in which students were allowed to select which school they would
attend; however, in that instance only a minimal number of students
chose to change schools, leaving segregated schools essentially un-
changed.36  The Court held that, although a voluntary system may be an
effective solution, it must “prove itself in operation,” and “if there are
reasonably available other ways . . . promising speedier and more effec-
tive conversion . . . ‘freedom of choice’ must be held unacceptable.”37
Green was followed by a large number of cases in the 1970’s exam-
ining a variety of approaches and further illuminating what the Court
would find to be a segregated school system.  One such approach, ap-
proved by the Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
cation, involved the use of transportation of students, usually through the
pairing of segregated schools of different racial groups and moving stu-
dents between the schools, and through the altering of school attendance
zones.38
The Court in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, ad-
dressed the question of school districts that were segregated only in part,
finding that the burden lay with the school districts to show that such
segregation was not due to segregative intent.39  Although the Court was
open to court intervention in such cases, it was more hesitant to allow
courts to order desegregation across school district lines.  As shown by
the Court’s holding in Milliken v. Bradley, a multi-district approach first
requires a finding that all the districts involved operated segregated
schools, that the boundary lines of the districts were drawn with segrega-
32 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
33 Id. 
34 Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
35 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
36 Green, 391 U.S. at 441.
37 Id. at 440–41.
38 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
39 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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tive intent, and that the districts acted in furtherance of segregation in
other districts.40
The Court also began addressing questions about the cessation of
desegregation orders.  Once a district has remedied segregation, there is
no need to monitor any changes in demographics on a year-to-year basis
unless a district takes some action that may affect the racial integration of
its schools.41  In order for a district to be found desegregated, the Court
requires that a district have “complied in good faith” and that “the ves-
tiges of past discrimination [have] been eliminated to the extent practica-
ble.”42  Although an examination of this requires a court to look at
“every facet of school operations,” once released from court order the
district still “remains subject to the mandate of the Equal Protection
Clause.”43  In examining how shifting residential populations can affect
school racial balances, the Court found that a district is not responsible
for de facto segregation in schools due to forces outside of its control and
is responsible only for de jure segregation caused by its own actions.44
As can be seen from this progression of cases, the trend of the Court
over time has been to more and more strictly restrain court interference
with the local control of school districts.  This was reiterated in Missouri
v. Jenkins, which clearly stated the principle that a remedy must be nar-
rowly tailored to redress the effects of unconstitutional action.45  How-
ever, the release of a district from a desegregation order is still predicated
only on whether the district has complied with the order in good faith
and whether segregation has been eliminated to the extent practicable.46
Further, the Court later held that, absent a finding that a school district
had engaged in unconstitutional segregative practices, a school district is
barred from the use of race-based assignment of students.47
In summary, the Supreme Court has held that any desegregation plan
may utilize student/parent choice if such a plan demonstrates that it will
correct the imbalances, but that the best and quickest means should be
used.  Restructuring of school neighborhood zones and transportation of
students between schools may also be appropriate.
Regardless of the approach utilized, it must be narrowly tailored to
remedy the violation and restore the injured parties to the position they
would have occupied had the violation not occurred.  Plans to correct de
40 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721 (1974).
41 Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
42 Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–50 (1991).
43 Id. at 250.
44 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992).
45 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995).
46 Id at 89.
47 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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facto segregation may not use race-specific remedies, as these are limited
only to cases of de jure segregation.  It is not necessary to find that an
entire school district is in violation to issue an order affecting the whole
of the district to correct any segregation present.  Desegregation orders
generally will be limited to a single school district unless there is a show-
ing that segregative intent influenced the formation of school district
lines in an effort to segregate between districts.  A district found in viola-
tion must work in good faith to eliminate segregation as much as is prac-
ticable.  Once a district has corrected past segregation, it need not
monitor on an annual basis, and the district will bear no responsibility for
segregation that results from forces outside of its control.
C. THE CALIFORNIA EDUCATION CODE AND DESEGREGATION
Any school desegregation plan, voluntary or court-ordered, must op-
erate within the California public school system, which itself is subject to
the California Education Code.  Although the history of Diaz v. San Jose
Unified School Dist. shows that the discussion of statutory requirements
for schools was minimal,48 the case originally precipitated from choices
made due to implementation of the Field Act.49  This act mandated that
schools be made earthquake-resistant, and as a  result of mandatory in-
spections under the Field Act, a number of schools in the District were
closed and new schools built to replace them.50  This presented the Dis-
trict with an opportunity to re-site the schools so as to alleviate de jure
segregation among its many schools; however, it chose not to do so,
which precipitated the initial lawsuit.51
Issues such as the procedures for school enrollment, the restrictions
on student transportation, the formation and alteration of school district
lines, the restrictions on student transfer between districts, and school site
selection all have a tremendous impact on the creation of de jure segrega-
tion and on efforts to desegregate those schools.
1. Student Enrollment and Assignment
California restricts the assignment of students to particular schools
on the basis of ethnicity, among a number of other characteristics.52
However, in order to receive school apportionments from the state school
48 See Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Cal. 1976), vacated, 612
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 316–17.
51 See id.
52 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35351 (Westlaw 2015).
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fund, every district is required to adopt rules and regulations for open
enrollment of resident students of the district, allowing a student to at-
tend any school in the district regardless of the specific residence of the
student (unless the district is required to maintain ethnic balances by its
discretion or by court order).53
Once a given school has received more applicants than its capacity
as determined by the district, enrollment must be on a random basis irre-
spective of the academic or athletic performance of a given student.54
Further, no student from within a given school’s attendance area may be
displaced by a student from outside that area.55
There are limited exceptions to this “at capacity” rule, the most com-
mon of which are based upon the attendance of a student’s sibling or
employment of a student’s parent at the school.56  This ensures that, un-
less a school’s capacity exceeds that of the student population in the
school’s attendance area, a given school will have students from within
that attendance area only.
These statutory requirements limit the ability of parent choice, ab-
sent some exception, to effectively promote desegregation in schools if
the school neighborhoods are themselves racially imbalanced.  Although
open enrollment within a district at any school is required, this is cut
short by the practical fact that, in a school at capacity, neighborhood
students will take precedence and may not be displaced by other stu-
dents.  Unless school capacity is significantly larger than the neighbor-
hood student population, non-neighborhood students will rarely be able
to enroll.
2. Student Transportation
In districts of any size, transportation plays a major role in the lives
of students and their families.57  California students are entitled to trans-
portation to school at the request of the parents or guardians, but only if
such transportation is required and funded by federal law.58  This trans-
portation may not be forced upon a student.59  As a result of this, any
plan that would attempt to shift students between schools would require
53 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160.5(b) (Westlaw 2015).
54 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160.5(b)(2)(B) (Westlaw 2015).
55 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160.5(b)(2)(C) (Westlaw 2015).
56 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160.5(b)(3)(B) (Westlaw 2015).
57 Solving a Big City Transportation Challenge, SCHOOLS FOR CHILDREN, INC., http://www.
schoolsforchildreninc.org/what-we-do/case-studies/success-story-transportation-more (last visited
Nov. 11, 2014).
58 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160.5(b)(4) (Westlaw 2015).
59 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35350 (Westlaw 2015).
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parental consent to such transportation.  Magnet and specialized enrich-
ment programs can offer an inducement toward such consent, but school
districts often incur significant expense to support such programs.60  Al-
though forced busing of students has been utilized elsewhere, it cannot
be used in California.
3. School District Lines
As our cities have expanded, so too have our school districts, shift-
ing district lines as needed.  The State Board of Education may approve
any reorganization of school districts based upon a number of conditions
being substantially met.61  One of those conditions is that each district
must comprise a “substantial community identity.”62  Another is that the
district reorganization must “not promote racial or ethnic discrimination
or segregation.”63
This may be a possible solution for the problem of segregation in
San Jose.  The District is one of the larger districts in the state, with a
significant student population,64 and splitting the district might be a plan
to examine.  However, the requirement that a district comprise a “sub-
stantial community identity” is vague and undefined.  Additionally, San
Jose’s mix of urban and suburban would present significant issues of
forming contiguous districts that do not segregate between districts.65
4. Interdistrict Transfer
There are procedures for students living in one school district to be
enrolled in a public school in another district.  Districts are expressly
allowed to deny the transfer of a student between districts if such transfer
would negatively impact a voluntary or court-ordered desegregation plan
or the ethnic balance within either district.66  The district of residence of
a student may not adopt policies designed to prevent or discourage such
transfers.67  Districts may not target the communication of the availabil-
ity of such transfers to specific students on any basis, including specific
60 See Robert A. Frahm, Magnet School Costs Strain State, Local Budgets, CT MIRROR (Jan.
26, 2010), http://ctmirror.org/magnet-school-costs-strain-state-local-budgets/.
61 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35753 (Westlaw 2015).
62 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35753(a)(2) (Westlaw 2015).
63 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35753(a)(4) (Westlaw 2015).
64 Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 310, 313 (N.D. Cal. 1976), vacated, 612
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
65 See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (mentioning that this could invoke
intra-district desegregation action).
66 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48355(a) (Westlaw 2015).
67 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48355(b) (Westlaw 2015).
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residential neighborhoods.68  This means that, although a district may not
prevent its students from transferring out to other districts, it may target a
neighboring district to draw students away through transfers, but such
efforts must be general and must not target individual students or specific
neighborhoods.
A student may also be deemed to be a resident of a district if a
parent or guardian works within that district for at least ten hours during
the school week.69  This cannot be used en masse, as the number of stu-
dents allowed such a transfer is restricted based on the student population
of the district of actual residence.70  This provision is currently scheduled
to be inoperative on July 1, 2017.71
Although the parent-workplace provision would allow a small num-
ber of students to transfer out of a district, since many adults do not
commute outside of the school district for work the vast majority of stu-
dents would not be able to use that exception and therefore could be
forbidden from transferring out of their home districts.  In addition, the
prohibition against targeting students to recruit for interdistrict transfers
into a district would further limit the ability of the district to bring
outside students into its schools.
5. School Site Selection
Standards for school site selection are set by the State Department of
Education.72  These regulations concern the size and shape of the site
footprint, various health and safety concerns, site access, location within
the proposed attendance area to avoid busing except for desegregation
purposes, proximity to other public services such as parks and libraries,
and short- and long-term costs.73  This gives significant latitude to a dis-
trict to change its neighborhood attendance zones, which could drasti-
cally affect the racial balance of given schools if their attendance zones
can be shifted in such a way as to redistribute students of specific ethnic-
ities.  The lack of utilizing such opportunities in school site selection is
one of the key factors that supported a finding of segregation in Diaz.74
68 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48355(c) (Westlaw 2015).
69 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48204(b) (Westlaw 2015).
70 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48204(b)(6) (Westlaw 2015).
71 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48204(c) (Westlaw 2015).
72 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17251(b) (Westlaw 2015).
73 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 14010 (Westlaw 2015).
74 Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 665.
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D. PROPOSITION 209 AND THE BERKELEY PLAN
The above statutory framework dealing with and impacting desegre-
gation plans has also been added to by an amendment to the California
Constitution.  Although districts are authorized to voluntarily implement
or continue school desegregation plans,75 a significant restraint was
placed upon these various plans when California voters approved Pro-
position 209 in 1996.76  Proposition 209 amended the California Consti-
tution to provide that no governmental entity may “discriminate against,
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting.”77  This prohibition
closely mirrors that announced by the United States Supreme Court in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
which restricts the use of ethnicity to cases in which de jure segregation
exists.78  Proposition 209 effectively prevents any voluntary integration
plan or state-court-ordered plan from using race as an explicit and deter-
minative factor in school enrollment policies.79
The Berkeley Unified School District in Alameda County, Califor-
nia, has adopted a novel approach in reaction to Proposition 209 that
attempts to address desegregation without using race as a determinative
factor.80  Berkeley schools are divided into three geographic attendance
zones, with multiple schools in each zone.81  The schools are individu-
ally required to balance, within certain tolerances, the geographic attend-
ance zone as a whole.82  This is determined by breaking down each zone
into a large number of four- to eight-city-block “planning areas,” which
are then categorized based on income, adult education level, and percent-
age of minority students within each area.83  These areas are then classi-
fied as category one (predominantly low-income, limited adult education
level, and large minority population), category two (a mix of these fac-
75 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
76 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (added by Prop. 209, effective Nov. 6, 1996).
77 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).
78 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
79 While Parents Involved restricted the use of ethnicity to the crafting of orders to correct de
jure segregation, Proposition 209 restricts school districts and state courts from any explicit use of
ethnicity for any purpose.
80 A similar approach is also being attempted in Jefferson County, Kentucky, by a former
defendant in Parents Involved. See Daniel Kiel, Accepting Justice Kennedy’s Dare: The Future of
Integration in a Post-PICS World, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873 (2010).
81 American Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 794 n.4
(Ct. App. 2009).
82 Id. at 794.
83 Id.
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tors), or category three (predominantly high-income, high adult educa-
tion level, and small minority population).84  Regardless of an individual
student’s race, each student within the area receives the same score.85
Priority in enrollment is given to students from categories that are under-
represented in a given school compared to the overall percentage in the
attendance zone.86
This approach is somewhat related to the pairing of schools used in
some busing plans, in that students from a larger geographic area may be
eligible to enroll at multiple schools.  This addresses the issue of neigh-
borhood students blocking other students from enrollment due to schools
being at or near capacity.  The challenges lie in trying to adapt the Berke-
ley plan from a district in a relatively small city87 to a very large district
in San Jose comprising a variety of housing concentrations88 and a stu-
dent population currently over three times the size of its Berkeley
counterpart.89
III. THE DIAZ PLAN HAS FAILED, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT
IT
Despite the successes of the Diaz plan in reducing segregation in
District schools, it has not had a lasting effect upon enrollment practices
and results.  Looking at numbers from the California Department of Edu-
cation, a trend can be found in the enrollment of Hispanic students in




86 Id. at 794–95.
87 About Berkeley, CITY OF BERKELEY, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/ContentDisplay.aspx?id
=7158 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015, 3:51 PM).
88 Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 310, 313 (N.D. Cal. 1976), vacated, 612
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
89 DataQuest, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (Nov. 7, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://
dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/page2.asp?level=CDIstrict&subject=enrollment&submit1=submit (From
this page, information can be accessed by selecting school years and entering district names).
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Percentage of Hispanic Students for 2002–2003 through
2012–2013 School Years90
 02–03 03–04 04–05 05–06 06–07 07–08 08–09 09–10 10–11 11–12 12–13 Net Change 
District Total 50.4 50.7 50.4 50.6 51.3 51.4 51.7 51.5 51.7 52.4 52.4 2.0 
Abraham Lincoln 53.6 54.6 57.5 56.8 59.7 62.7 64.2 66.2 67.2 69.2 70.3 16.7 
Gunderson 48.2 51.5 51.9 51.3 53.1 56.3 56.9 56.0 57.7 58.2 57.9 9.7 
Leland 13.8 13.1 12.7 13.3 12.0 13.6 12.9 12.5 11.9 10.6 10.8 -3.0 
Pioneer 27.8 26.2 27.7 28.6 29.6 30.4 29.5 30.3 31.9 32.8 32.2 4.4 
San Jose 61.5 62.1 60.7 64.6 72.2 75.1 77.2 78.0 76.6 78.2 78.6 17.1 
Willow Glen 56.7 56.5 56.5 56.2 58.4 59.2 57.7 55.7 54.0 52.6 52.8 -3.9 
Table 2. Hispanic Student Enrollment Percentages for 2002 to 2013
Although the numbers present in the 2002–2003 school year were a
marked improvement from the pre-desegregation-order school years,91
the current numbers show a disturbing trend of returning segregation.  As
can be seen by the net change over the listed years, schools dispropor-
tionately increased their Hispanic student population, while the District
student population as a whole has only minimally increased.  Two
schools in particular (Leland and Willow Glen) have decreased their per-
centage of Hispanic students, while other schools (Abraham Lincoln and
San Jose) have shown increases far beyond the District’s total increase in
Hispanic students.  These changes disproportionately impact schools
with Hispanic student populations already well in excess of the District
enrollment.  Three high schools would fall out of the +/- 20% range re-
quired by the Diaz court order (Leland, Pioneer, and San Jose) with a
fourth school very close to that line and trending toward passing it (Lin-
coln).  With only modest changes to the District’s Hispanic population as
a whole, something must have changed to cause such a rapid swing away
from the earlier trend under the Diaz order.
A. THE DISTRICT VOLUNTARY INTEGRATION PLAN’S FAILURE
This may be in large part due to the change from the court-ordered
plan to the current Voluntary Integration Plan (VIP) used by the Dis-
trict.92  The VIP states that the District will “regularly review its pro-
posed and/or existing policies, programs, practices, procedures, and
90 DataQuest, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (Nov. 4, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://
dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/page2.asp?level=school&subject=enrollment&submit1=submit (From this
page, information can be accessed by selecting school years and entering school names).
91 Diaz, 412 F. Supp. at 322.
92 SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCH. DIST., VOLUNTARY INTEGRATION PLAN (2010), available at http://
www.sjusd.org/pdf/districtinformation/Voluntary_Integration_Plan.pdf.
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decisions to assess whether any such measure appears to be having an
adverse effect upon racial integration.”93  In addition, “when considering
action and policy alternatives, [the District will] consider their potential
racial and ethnic impact, and where appropriate and consistent with
sound educational policy, endeavor to reject alternatives that create or
intensify racial isolation in its schools.”94
In practice, however, the VIP has drastically altered the student as-
signment process for middle and high school students.95  Whereas the
court-ordered plan placed the neighborhood of a student as a low priority
for attending a magnet or specialty enrichment program school,96 the
VIP places this as the primary determining factor,97 with this change
being the most drastic difference between the two plans for student en-
rollment.  Although the segregative effect shown by the shifting
demographics of student enrollment may be the result of de facto segre-
gated communities, the VIP does not adequately address this as com-
pared to the court-ordered plan.  With a return to the neighborhood
school zone being the determinative factor in enrollment, other changes
must be made if the District is to avoid a return of segregated schools.
As shown by the data above, the current plan has resulted in num-
bers that do not fit the definition provided by the court and is showing a
trend away from that goal.  Although the court order did promote the
desegregation of the District, once released from that court order the Dis-
trict significantly altered its policies for student enrollment.  As a conse-
quence, the existing and largely unchanged school neighborhoods and
neighborhood school policy have resulted in segregated schools in the
District.  A permanent solution was not achieved, and the District is pre-
vented from reinstating the policies and procedures of the court order due
to the inclusion of enrollment caps based on ethnicity.98  The shape of
any new solution must conform to the legal requirements established
both by the courts and by California law.
B. ADAPTING THE BERKELEY PLAN TO SAN JOSE
Although the Diaz plan relied heavily on voluntary transfers of stu-
dents, it also included provisions based explicitly on ethnicity, which are
now precluded from consideration in any new plans due to Proposition
93 Id. at 1.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 4.
96 Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 633 F. Supp. 808, 817 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
97 SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCH. DIST., supra note 93, at 4.
98  See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
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209.  The Berkeley plan has survived judicial scrutiny on this basis99, but
Berkeley Unified enrolls only 9,779 students compared to the District’s
33,184 students (as of the 2012–2013 school year).100  In addition to be-
ing over three times the size in student population, the city of San Jose
(although not coextensive with the District, it is a close match) is 176.53
square miles with a population density of 5,358.7 persons per square
mile, whereas Berkeley is only 10.47 square miles with a population den-
sity of 10,752.6 persons per square mile.101  A dense population in a
small area allows for easy transfer of students between schools, while the
significantly larger San Jose has a much more geographically dispersed
population, making any transfers very difficult.  This difficulty must be
addressed if the Berkeley plan is to be applied in San Jose.
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to examine whether the
Berkeley plan categorization of the various census blocks in San Jose
would be diverse enough across the whole of the District to allow the
plan to be applied independently in each school neighborhood. But it
may be worth exploring whether it would be possible to group schools
into geographic zones that would reflect the demographics of the District
as a whole, thus treating each of these zones as the whole of Berkeley
Unified is treated under its plan.  Unfortunately, the schools with the
most segregated numbers are also on opposite sides of the District (see
Fig. 1), making any zoning changes difficult to address due to the long
bus trips necessary to move students across such a large area.
99 American Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Ct.
App. 2009).
100 DataQuest, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (Dec. 22, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://
dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/page2.asp?level=district&subject=enrollment&submit1=submit (From this
page, information can be accessed by selecting school years and entering district names).
101 State & County QuickFacts, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/table/PST045214/0606000,00 (last visited on Dec. 22, 2013, 6:50 PM).
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Figure 1. Map of San Jose Unified School District noting location of
District High Schools102 demonstrating the distance between the schools
with over-represented Hispanic populations (Lincoln and San Jose), and
the schools with predominantly under-represented Hispanic populations
(Pioneer and Leland)
While moving school neighborhood attendance zones could be read-
ily achieved, the District’s geography does not lend itself to any easy
solutions.  The VIP’s current approach to enrollment is to prioritize stu-
dents based on neighborhood attendance, with no use of district-wide
programs and, where they still exist, magnet programs given a lower pri-
ority than neighborhood residence.103  The option exists, however, to re-
turn some schools to district-wide attendance zones, thus allowing
priority to return to students electing into the various magnet programs.
The District had previously expressed the thought that voluntary trans-
fers for the district-wide magnet programs would be sufficient to deseg-
regate the schools,104 yet this is a primary difference between the court
102 American FactFinder, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 22, 2013, 7:47 PM), http://
factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml?ref=geo&refresh=T&tab=map&src=
bkmk. Under “Find a Location, search for San Jose Unified School District. School address data
retrieved from San Jose Unified School District High Schools (Dec. 22, 2013, 7:23 PM), http://
www.sjusd.org/schools/high-schools/, and manually approximated by the Author on the map.
103 SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, supra note 93, at 4.
104 Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 633 F. Supp. 808, 815 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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order and the current VIP initiated by the District.  While the costs for
transportation associated with this are not within the scope of this Com-
ment, an examination of the feasibility of such a change in enrollment
policy versus the cost of any future litigation would be advisable.
C. CURRENT POLICIES WILL LEAD TO FUTURE LITIGATION
Should the District not take up a voluntary option, such as that
presented supra, the District will likely be found in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, should litigation be pursued against it.  The
Ninth Circuit has stated that changing or failing to change a policy “with
full knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence upon racial
imbalance in a school system is one factor . . . in determining whether an
inference of segregative intent should be drawn”105 and that proof of
foreseeable consequences and the historical sequence of events are
highly relevant to this inquiry.106  After being relieved from the Diaz
court order, the District chose to implement its VIP, which included self-
directives to “regularly review” policies for their effect on segregation
and to actively “prevent racial or ethnic isolation from surfacing in Dis-
trict schools.”107  This active policy choice, with an awareness of the
consequences for segregation, is similar to the active choices and aware-
ness of consequences for segregation that led to the Diaz case.108
These changes to enrollment policies include the change of enroll-
ment priorities to return to a neighborhood-first policy that was part of
the enrollment practices held to be in violation by Diaz.109  By returning
to a previous invalid system of enrollment, the District would be aware
that the system would still be in violation.  Additionally, the readily
available demographic data, and the District’s own statements in the VIP
of its commitment to regularly monitor its schools for the effect of these
policies on ethnic balances, would support a finding that the District is
aware of the effect of the policy changes made by the VIP and has not
moved to correct for these foreseeable consequences.110
105 Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 612 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1979).
106 Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 663 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
107 SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, supra note 93, at 1.
108 See Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 412 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Cal. 1976), vacated,
612 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
109 Diaz, 733 F.2d at 664 (“[T]he location and construction of new schools and the closing of
old schools . . . are decisions that may determine whether the prescribed neighborhood attendance
areas will be integrated or segregated.”).
110 This data is readily available to the District, and the VIP states that the District has as-
sumed a duty to monitor this data.  This demonstrates that the District is aware of the data, which
shows a trend returning to pre-Diaz segregation.  Additionally, the District has made controlled and
limited changes to the enrollment policies, and the overall changes to the population living within
20
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Although the Hispanic student population has increased slightly dur-
ing the years covered by the data presented in Table 2, this small change
has been disproportionally borne by schools with already-high Hispanic
student populations, thus increasing segregation of this population.  The
VIP was originally approved by the District on June 19, 2003,111 when
percentages of Hispanic enrollment were largely unchanged from 1993
(see Table 1).  After this change in policy, the Hispanic student popula-
tion has been allowed to swell disproportionately at the two high schools
(Lincoln and San Jose) that were also the high schools most impacted by
the disproportionate enrollment of Hispanic students in 1974 (see Table
1 and Table 2).  By removing one of the key provisions of the court order
that led to desegregation in the high schools, and by returning to a neigh-
borhood school system of enrollment such as that used pre-Diaz, the Dis-
trict has caused the schools to begin resegregating.  This result both was
foreseeable by the District at the time of the policy change, and is cur-
rently recognizable through readily available data from the District and
the Department of Education.  All that remains is for someone to file a
claim, and the District will face a significant risk of being found in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause by the maintenance of a segregated
school system.
D. FUTURE COURT-ORDERED DESEGREGATION SHOULD UTILIZE
DISTRICT REORGANIZATION
As has been demonstrated by the actions of the District, enrollment
policies are easily changed.  Although we may muse as to the reasons for
the change, unless there exists some explicit and vindictive racism within
the District, there are probably some pressures (such as transportation
costs) that led the District to change a system that appeared to have been
working to eliminate and prevent segregation within District schools.
Therefore, any future court order should use some measures that are
more physical in nature and thus less susceptible to easy alteration.
One possible option is to order changes to school sites and attend-
ance zones.  With increased capacity at schools, students will more read-
ily be able to move to schools outside their immediate neighborhoods
without requiring any change to enrollment policies.112  By establishing
overlapping attendance zones, students within an overlapping area may
the District are known and do not support the degree of change demonstrated by the data on school
enrollment.  Given that one of the changes to enrollment policies made by the District was to change
the priorities for enrollment at the existing magnet programs, this marks a shift toward pre-Diaz
practices, with the foreseeable consequence of a return of pre-Diaz enrollment statistics.
111 SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, supra note 93, at 1.
112 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 14010 (Westlaw 2015).
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have priority enrollment based on a neighborhood enrollment policy at
either school.113  If the overlapping areas are positioned in predominantly
minority neighborhoods, these students will have greater flexibility in
enrollment.  A supplementary approach would be to order the construc-
tion of new schools at specific sites to alleviate segregation based on
segregated housing patterns.  Placing these new schools between existing
schools of disproportionately high and disproportionately low Hispanic
populations and setting the new school’s attendance zone as largely over-
lapping the preexisting schools may alleviate imbalance at the preexist-
ing schools.
Another category of option that could result in a much more perma-
nent change is a full reorganization of the District, possibly by splitting
the District.  The unfortunate problems of geography discussed above
will present a problem here as well, however, and it may take the joining
of neighboring school districts to be able to form viable district lines that
would not encourage segregation.  This is highly unlikely in a court or-
der, as the Supreme Court has expressed a general preference to avoid
multi-district solutions.114  Alternatively, a possible solution could in-
volve splitting the District into smaller districts with single high schools,
but any such district lines would have to be drawn in a way that would
not further segregation while also maintaining “substantial community
identity.”115  This community identity, although vague, seems to be read-
ily drawn on existing school neighborhood lines, but given that these
neighborhoods are ethnically imbalanced, it would leave the formation of
these districts open to accusations that they “promote racial or ethnic
discrimination or segregation.”116
All of these options involve significant expenditure, and such plans
would be highly complicated and far outside the scope of this Comment.
It is my hope, however, given the greater resources available when this
returns to court, that these options may be further explored in an effort to
produce a more permanent and physical change to the District to prevent
an easy return of segregation.  It is unlikely that a court could be per-
suaded to split the district, due to the immense complication presented by
that option, so that option is probably best left as a voluntary option to be
presented to the communities in question.  Instead, the redrawing of
school neighborhood attendance zones, the creation of more overlapping
zones and the use of district-wide schools, and an increase in school ca-
pacity, while possibly presenting significant costs, may be a more palat-
113 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160.5(b)(2)(C) (Westlaw 2015).
114 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721 (1974).
115 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35753(a) (Westlaw 2015).
116 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35753(a)(4) (Westlaw 2015).
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able option for the courts while still resulting in a longer-lasting effect.
Combining this with directives for changes in new school site construc-
tion, development of the physical structure of the district may result in a
more permanent solution that had been missed by Diaz.
IV. THE FUTURE OF DESEGREGATION IN SAN JOSE
As shown by the changing school demographics within the District
since the implementation of the VIP, the District has returned to the seg-
regative effects that were present in the 1970’s leading up to Diaz.
Given the changes made by the District in adopting the VIP, it will likely
be found in violation of the Equal Protection Clause if it is once again
called to court by minority students in the District.  Although any
changes that would turn the tide against this shift toward resegregation
may be costly, the District must either correct the situation now through
a means of its own choosing or be forced through court order to once
again eliminate the segregation knowingly caused by the District’s policy
choices.
With the current budgetary issues within public education in mind,
costs will surely be a driving issue in any discussion of solutions.  The
Diaz plan demonstrated that it was largely effective and, despite the Pro-
position 209 amendment to the California Constitution and recent U.S.
Supreme Court cases, that plan may be effectively reinstated by incorpo-
rating elements of the Berkeley Unified School District plan.  It may also
be prudent for the District to explore more drastic reorganization of the
District, through some combination of splitting and ceding parts of the
District to willing neighboring school districts, but such a plan may be
politically or fiscally impossible.  However, despite these obstacles, these
are still options that the District should explore.  Additionally, the Dis-
trict may find geographically and fiscally viable options for altering at-
tendance boundaries with modest increases to school capacity to allow
greater voluntary movement of students to alleviate segregation.
Barring voluntary action on the part of the District, all of these op-
tions will be at the court’s disposal in ordering corrective action.  The
District should explore all the above options in anticipation of future le-
gal action, as it will find that data indispensable in that litigation.  The
court should be aware of where the Diaz plan failed and take measures to
ensure a more lasting solution that cannot simply be switched back as
soon as the present violations are corrected, such as alterations to school
attendance zones, increases to school capacity, and possibly even split-
ting the District.
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Ultimately, any school district must deal with segregation that exists
outside of its control.  Neighborhoods populated on largely ethnic lines
can, when sufficiently large, overwhelm the ability of a school system to
integrate those ethnic neighborhoods with different ethnic populations.
The isolation of different ethnic groups caused by larger social issues is
an undeniable fact of life in many communities.  Although some have
placed partial blame for these ethnically based housing patterns on
school systems,117 efforts in other areas of social justice may be the only
lasting solution to school segregation.  However, even if that is the basis
for the situation in San Jose, or in any school district, if the idea that
segregated school systems are inherently unequal remains true, then the
burden is placed upon all in the community to attempt any available,
effective, and legal means to adapt to the challenges presented by the
structure of the community, in order to give each student access to a
positive educational experience.
117 See Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Public Decisions and Private
Choices: Reassessing the School-Housing Segregation Link in the Post-Parents Involved Era, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397 (2013).
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